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Scenarios, roadmaps and similar foresight methods are used to cope with uncertainty 
in areas with long planning horizons, such as energy policy, and research into the 
future of hydrogen energy has been no exception. Such studies can play an 
important role in the development of shared visions of the future: creating powerful 
expectations of the potential of emerging technologies and mobilising resources 
necessary for their realisation.    
 
This paper reviews the hydrogen futures literature, using a six-fold typology to map 
the state of the art of scenario construction. The paper then explores the expectations 
embodied in the literature, through the ‘answers’ it provides to questions about the 
future of hydrogen. What are the drivers, barriers and challenges facing the 
development of a hydrogen economy? What are the key technological building 
blocks required? In what kinds of futures does hydrogen become important? What 
does a hydrogen economy look like, how and when does it evolve, and what does it 
achieve? 
 
The literature describes a diverse range of possible futures, from decentralised 
systems based upon the small-scale renewables, through to centralised systems 
reliant on nuclear energy or carbon-sequestration. There is a broad consensus that 
the hydrogen economy emerges only slowly, if all under ‘Business as Usual’ 
scenarios. Rapid transitions to hydrogen occur only under conditions of strong 
governmental support combined with, or as a result of, major ‘discontinuities’ such 
as shifts in society’s environmental values, ‘game changing’ technological 
breakthroughs, or rapid increases in the oil price or speed and intensity of climate 
change. 
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1. Introduction 
Scenarios, roadmaps and similar foresight methods are increasingly used in 
academia,  government and industry as a means of coping with uncertainty in areas 
with long planning horizons, such as energy or transport policy (Greeuw et al. 
2000). Research into the future of hydrogen as an energy carrier and the putative 
‘hydrogen economy’ has been no exception. There is a rich contemporary literature, 
spanning articles in academic peer reviewed journals and official or semi-official 
policy documents, through to works of popular advocacy, exploring the future 
potential of hydrogen energy.  
 
Foresight methods and approaches can play an important role in the development 
and propagation of shared visions of the future, creating powerful expectations of 
the economic, social and environmental potential of emerging technologies; and 
mobilising the intellectual, financial, political and institutional resources necessary 
for their realisation (Weber 2004). 
 
This paper presents an extensive review of the current (English language) hydrogen 
futures literature, and maps the state of the art of scenario construction around 
hydrogen. The review undertaken for this work is not an exhaustive list of all 
hydrogen futures studies ever published. Rather, the aim has been to capture the 
diversity of the current hydrogen futures literature by identifying groups of studies, 
and characterising them by asking questions about their aims, how they were put 
together, what kinds of perspectives they have of the future and of technological 
change, and over what sort of timescales each type of study tends to operate.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the search strategies 
used to identify and analyse the hydrogen futures literature. Section 3 presents a 
simple typology that characterises this diverse literature according to the objectives, 
methodology and narrative structure of the studies discussed. Six broadly distinct, 
although not entirely exclusive, types of study are identified. These are: 1) 
Forecasts; 2) Exploratory Scenarios; 3) Technical Scenarios; 4) Visions; 5) 
Backcasts/Pathways; and, 6) Roadmaps. Section 4 then provides a second analytical 
‘cut’ on this literature by interrogating it for the answers it provides to a series of 
questions about the future of the hydrogen economy: 
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• What are the drivers of a hydrogen economy? 
• What are the barriers and challenges facing the development of a hydrogen 
economy? 
• In what kinds of future does hydrogen become important? 
• Which technologies are important and what does a hydrogen economy look 
like? 
• How does a hydrogen economy develop and evolve? 
• When does a hydrogen economy emerge? and 
• What does a hydrogen economy achieve? 
   
Finally, section 5 draws together some overarching conclusions and reflections. 
2. Review Methodology 
Studies were identified by using electronic journal databases and internet searches to 
search for: ‘Hydrogen or fuel cells’ AND ‘economy’; ‘scenario’; ‘futures’; 
‘roadmap’; ‘pathway’; ‘routemap’; ‘forecast’; ‘foresight’; ‘backcast(ing)’; ‘vision’. 
Some studies were also brought to the attention of the investigators by colleagues 
working in the field. 
 
Studies were included that described a hydrogen or fuel cell future, or a strategy or 
‘route’ by which a hydrogen or fuel cell future might develop. There was a focus on 
those studies which were most relevant to the UK, but studies specific to other 
countries were included (Andersen et al. 2004; Arnasson & Sigfusson 2000; 
Australian Government 2003; Fuel Cells Canada; US Department of Energy 2002).  
 
A total of 40 studies, published between 1996 and 2004, were reviewed. Of these 11 
focus on hydrogen or fuel cells in road transport, whilst a handful looked only at 
stationary fuel cell applications. Most studies considered hydrogen or fuel cells in 
more general contexts, including a variety of production routes and uses. All of the 
studies were analysed against a standard template to ensure that the same elements 
of each were captured and compared in a rigorous and efficient manner (McDowall 
& Eames 2004). 
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3. A Typology of Hydrogen Futures 
 
Our analysis identified six distinct though overlapping types of hydrogen futures 
study1. These can be further grouped into ‘descriptive’ and ‘normative’ approaches. 
See Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1: A typology of hydrogen futures 
 
                                                 
1
 This typology has been developed post-hoc: the individual studies do not 




Table 2. Studies classified as ‘Forecasts’ 
 
Two ‘roadmaps’ also included market forecasts as part of the study (Fuel Cells 
Canada 2003; HyNet 2004). 
 
Forecasts are characterised by the use of quantitative methods to predict futures 
based on current trends, or based on surveys of expert opinion (Kosugi et al. 2004). 
They tend to explore shorter time scales (up to 2030). Most used inputs such as 
technological learning curves, demand projections, fuel cost or oil price projections, 
and the characteristics of competing technologies to model market penetration of 
fuel cells or hydrogen (Christidis et al. 2003; Fukushima et al. 2004; Mima & Criqui 
2003; Thomas et al. 1998). Some used ‘scenarios’ (here meaning variations in the 
set of input assumptions) to explore the impact of different factors on shaping the 
future of hydrogen. The most basic forecast in the literature simply extrapolates 
sales figures from 1996-2003 to project stationary fuel cell market growth to 2020 
(HyNet 2004). 
 
Rates of adoption of hydrogen technologies are considered to be largely a function 
of their relative costs compared to alternative technologies. However, several of the 
above studies also model the effects of policy interventions such as carbon taxes. 
 
In assessing what necessary developments must occur in order for a hydrogen 
economy to develop, these studies focus on concrete technological challenges (e.g. 
price of fuel cell electricity per kWh). The central challenge to a hydrogen economy 
is seen as bringing down the costs of hydrogen technologies, along with creating the 
necessary market conditions for penetration, such as the establishment of a 
refuelling infrastructure (sometimes assumed for the purposes of the modelling 
exercise). 
 
Significant strengths of forecasting approaches are that they can provide: 
quantitative targets for technology development (providing a sense of performance 
and cost necessary to compete successfully); a quantitative consistency check and 
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basis for exploring the importance of different assumptions; and unlike many of the 
other studies reviewed, they tend to view hydrogen in the context of wider energy 
systems and competing technologies. 
 
However, forecasts, particularly over long time-horizons, have been widely 
criticised for an overly deterministic view of the future (Berkhout & Hertin 2002; 
Smil 2000), and of technological change (Geels & Smit 2000). Such criticisms 
challenge the assumption that new technologies simply replace old ones, without 
perturbing the technological ‘regime’ or ‘paradigm’ in which they operate: creating 
new markets, new institutions, and new user behaviours and patterns of 
consumption. By themselves, such forecasts may be of limited use in helping us to 
understand the complex processes by which large technological systems are 
transformed. 
 
3.2 Exploratory scenarios 
Table 3. Studies classified as ‘Exploratory Scenarios’ 
 
Rather than extrapolating from existing trends, exploratory scenarios seek to inform 
policymaking by illuminating underlying drivers of change, often drawing upon tacit 
knowledge and expertise, to build internally consistent storylines describing a 
number of possible futures.  
 
The exploratory scenarios reviewed here explore longer-term (2030 – 2100) futures 
and include trend-breaking developments. However, whilst the possibility of 
including ‘surprise’ elements is thought to be a key strength of the exploratory 
approach (van Notten et al. 2004; Schwartz 1996), this possibility was explicitly 
discussed in only two of the exploratory studies reviewed (Ohi 2002, Shell 2001), 
and not by others which nonetheless invoked trend-breaking changes such as 
sweeping shifts in social values (Barreto et al. 2003; Di Mario et al. 2003). 
Similarly, though some authors have emphasised the importance of participatory 
techniques in exploratory scenario building, (e.g. Berkhout & Hertin 2002), only the 
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studies by Ohi (2002), Watson et al. (2004) and the Australian Government (2003) 
appear to have involved stakeholders in their development. 
 
Unlike most of the other studies reviewed in this paper, several of the exploratory 
studies made explicit reference to theories of technological change, such as Geels’ 
multi-level perspective of technological transitions (Geels 2002; used by Andersen 
et al. 2004 and Watson et al. 2004). 
 
Three of the exploratory studies reviewed develop existing scenario sets e.g. the UK 
Foresight Futures framework (Watson et al. 2004) and the IPCC SRES scenario B1 
(Barreto et al. 2003; Di Mario et al. 2003). These studies explore the potential for 
hydrogen within their ‘parent’ scenarios, and use quantitative models (such as 
MESSAGE-MACRO, POLES, or the purpose-built THESIS) to enrich and help 
quantify the scenario outputs. 
 
The other exploratory studies develop new scenarios and storylines to explore the 
conditions under which a hydrogen future might unfold (Andersen et al. 2004; 
Australian Government 2003; Kurani et al. 2003; Ohi 2002; Shell 2001). This 
involves identifying sets of drivers that are likely to be important in the future 
development of hydrogen technologies and the transition to a ‘hydrogen economy’. 
At least one study assumed the presence of strong pro-hydrogen policies, to 
investigate the implications of such policies in a variety of future worlds (Andersen 
et al. 2004).  
 
The exploratory scenarios stand out as having more structured approaches to 
thinking about drivers, although they tend to emphasise those that operate at the 
‘landscape’ level. This approach has been criticised as being overly ‘top-down’ 
(Geels 2002b). However, when considering long time periods it arguably provides a 
useful means of capturing the broad dimensions of change. Table 2. (below) outlines 
the dimensions chosen by the eight exploratory scenario studies, such as rate of 
technological change, or type of governance.  
 
Table 4: Major drivers in exploratory scenarios 
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An important feature of exploratory scenarios is that the storylines are not supposed 
to be driven by a preconceived desirable end-point. However, many of the 
exploratory scenario studies reviewed here include a ‘happy ending’ storyline, in 
which CO2 is dramatically reduced and society is reasonably well off and secure. 
These scenarios tend to involve rapid technological change integrated with a socially 
responsible and globally co-ordinated society – with a significant role for hydrogen. 
This suggests a tendency for such exercises to come up with an unconscious 
‘favourite’ – one that, in this case, is usually decidedly pro-hydrogen. 
3.3 Technical Scenarios 
 
Table 5. Studies classified as ‘Technical Scenarios’ 
 
The approach of these studies is best summed by Hart et al. (2004): 
 
“…the purpose is not to predict the uptake of alternative fuels or vehicles…, but to assess 
the implications of a large-scale move, should it be attempted.” 
 
These studies explore different possible hydrogen-based technological systems, and 
assess the implications of these against a range of criteria, such as carbon emissions, 
cost, and technical feasibility. Technical scenarios are much more specific about the 
systems envisaged for the future, and how these might work in technological terms. 
Whilst such studies can make an important contribution to assessing the feasibility 
and desirability of alternative future systems, they often neglect the social and 
cultural dimensions of technological change.  
 
The future is viewed as a series of more or less static technological options, rather 
than storylines of technological change. Most of the studies (Eyre et al. 2002; Hart et 
al. 2004; Ogden 1999; Sørensen et al. 2004) make assumptions about future demand 
for energy provided by hydrogen, and model possible systems that would meet that 
demand. Of the five studies, three investigate the potential for producing hydrogen 
entirely from renewable resources. 
 
The drivers for change are considered at the macro-level of carbon emissions and 
energy security, while the major barriers identified are the higher costs of hydrogen 
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technologies, and the lack of renewable electricity supplies. However, these studies 
do not attempt to investigate the dynamics of the transitions to the modelled 
systems, and therefore do not explore the broader factors that would promote or 
inhibit particular futures developing, or how a hydrogen infrastructure might 
develop, as these issues are outside the scope of the analysis. 
 
3.4 Visions 
Table 6. Studies classified as ‘Visions’ 
 
There are two broad types of ‘vision’ identified in the literature. The first, and the 
kind with which this section is concerned, are produced by individuals or small 
groups, outlining a desirable hydrogen future. The second is produced through 
stakeholder workshops to provide the basis for a ‘road-mapping’ exercise, and is an 
attempt to generate a shared picture of a desirable future and way forward. This 
latter type will be considered under ‘Roadmaps’. 
 
Vision studies present, often rather utopian, narrative descriptions of a future 
hydrogen economy. In so doing they aim to show that a hydrogen economy is both 
plausible and desirable. These studies tend to be rhetorical rather than analytical. 
Their role is not to analyse or predict the future; the strength of the approach is that 
they expand the possibilities considered, and create a shared picture of what the 
future could be. Timescales are generally undefined, although visions are often set 
further into the future than more formal futures exercises. They also tend to include 
more ‘surprise’ elements that break with current trends (e.g. technological 
breakthroughs, shifts in social values). A notable misfit amongst these studies is a 
paper by Bossel et al. (2003), which presents a vision of an alternative to hydrogen, 
the ‘liquid synthetic-hydrocarbon economy’. 
 
Generally these visions depict a future where technological, infrastructural and 
institutional changes go hand-in-hand with a shift towards greener social values and 
a more egalitarian society. In the more radical examples, the hydrogen economy 
heralds no less than ‘the redistribution of power on earth’ (Rifkin 2002). Some even 
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frame a transition to a hydrogen economy as an inevitable development of human 
‘progress’ – e.g. Dunn (2001). 
 
While some see technological transitions as manageable through R&D investment, 
demonstration projects, taxes, and strong government leadership (Dunn 2001; 
Lovins & Williams 1999), others invoke a need for major shifts in social values 
(Goltsov & Veziroglu 2001), or revolutionary technological breakthroughs (Bockris 
1999). However, most visions do not directly address the dynamics of change or the 
development of infrastructure. 
 
The macro drivers of the transition to a hydrogen economy are perceived to be its 
potential societal benefits particularly with respect to climate change, but also fossil 
fuel depletion, energy security, air pollution, and ‘geo-political dominance’. 
However, at a meso/micro level, government actions and policy measures, such as 
funding for demonstration projects, tax regimes, and education programs, are seen as 
critical to shaping the emergence of a hydrogen economy. Other ‘micro’ drivers 
include the development of renewable energy and hydrogen technologies, and 
potential synergies between building and vehicle energy use. 
 
The degree of commonality amongst visions is striking, not least because they tend 
to gloss over potential areas of disagreement, such as the potential role of carbon 
sequestration or nuclear power. All the visions, with the exception of Bossel et al. 
(2003), see an eventual transition to a system in which hydrogen and electricity are 
predominant energy carriers, and are used more or less interchangeably. Vehicles 
will be fuelled by direct hydrogen, not synthetic or fossil hydrocarbons. Hydrogen 
provides the ‘missing link’ for intermittent renewables, allowing the entire world to 
move to a zero carbon economy. A weakness of the visions is that they tend to gloss 
over areas of disagreement (such as roles for carbon sequestration or nuclear power), 
and potential pitfalls or disadvantages associated with the development of a 
hydrogen economy.  
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3.5 Backcasts & Pathways 
 
Table 7. Studies classified as ‘Backcasts & Pathways’ 
 
These studies all start with the assumption that some form of hydrogen economy is 
desirable, and investigate possible paths by which the transition to that hydrogen 
future might be attained. Indeed, this attention transition issues is a key strength of 
these studies. This normative scenario process is in the spirit of backcasting, in 
which a future vision is elaborated, and storylines work back from that vision to the 
present (Robinson 1982). However, none of these studies represent extensive 
backcasting studies, nor do any refer explicitly to the methodological literature on 
backcasting or scenario building more generally. For most, a clear picture of a future 
hydrogen economy remains undefined, though goals are sometimes expressed as 
targets (e.g. California Fuel Cell Partnership target for number of fuel cell vehicles 
(FCVs) on the road). 
 
Typical timescales range from 2020 to 2050. Only the California study considers the 
possible effects of ‘surprise’ and discontinuities. Despite the attention to transition 
issues, few appear to draw explicitly on theoretical literatures on change in large 
technological systems. Most rely on a simple technology push/market pull models of 
technological change. An exception is Farrell et al. (2001), which is heavily 






Table 8. Studies classified as ‘Roadmaps’ 
 
Like backcasts, roadmaps assume the desirability of hydrogen, often defining a 
(usually vague) vision, and outlining a series of steps to get there. The difference 
with backcasts/pathways is in the way that roadmaps view the future, as explained 
below. 
 
In general, assumptions about the future are not made explicit or explored, leaving 
‘business as usual’, or the continuation of current trends as a default perspective. 
Unlike in other futures studies, the future is described only in terms of the actions to 
be taken and the targets to be met, rather than elaborating broader aspects of a future 
world, or describing storylines. The future is treated instrumentally, as a ‘policy 
problem’, with the emphasis placed on what is to be achieved.  
 
Most of these roadmaps combine three important aims. Firstly, to identify barriers to 
the emergence of a hydrogen future and the measures needed to overcome them. 
They explore and, often graphically, communicate the relationships between future 
markets, technologies and policies (Phaal et al. 2003). Secondly, most fulfil an 
advocacy function. As a result it has been suggested that many roadmaps create 
unrealistically rosy expectations of a technology’s future (Geels & Smit 2000). 
Lastly, the roadmapping process seeks to bring together key stakeholders to develop 
a shared vision of the future: a common ‘script’, defining agreed roles and cues for 
action. Whilst this may also be an implicit function of other types of scenario 
studies, it is an explicit aims of many roadmapping initiatives.  
The great strength of the roadmapping approach is the identification of barriers and 
solutions to them, and generation of shared targets. While the process itself is often 
important in terms of bringing together stakeholders in a common strategic forum, 




Building a roadmap usually involves groups of stakeholders identifying the drivers, 
barriers, targets, and wider threats and opportunities. Some roadmaps are less 
inclusive, and are produced by advocates of particular policy routes. The approach is 
very pragmatic. Policies are usually identified for the short term (5-10 years), with 
targets mapped out over the longer term (up to 2050 and beyond). Such studies are 
often dominated by rather linear market pull/technology push perspectives.  
 
4. What does the literature say about a hydrogen future? 
 
Having outlined the main types of hydrogen futures studies, the following section 
examines what this literature tells us by examining the answers it provides to a series 
of specific questions about the future of the hydrogen economy,.  
4.1 What are the drivers of a hydrogen economy? 
 
The literature revealed divergent views on the factors that will shape the future of 
hydrogen energy. In many of the visions and exploratory scenarios, for example, the 
development of a hydrogen future is explicitly seen as being driven by shifting 
social values, particularly the emergence of stronger environmental values, but also 
greater concern for social equity: the later being perceived to underpin a shift away 
from centralised energy production and distribution towards more distributed forms 
of generation.     
 
Many of the visions suggest that the major technological barriers have been 
overcome, or are readily solvable, as long as the political will is there to provide 
funding and support (e.g. Dunn 2001; Lovins & Williams 1999; Goltsov & 
Veziroglu 2001; Rifkin 2002). These studies frame the hydrogen economy as an 
issue of politics – held back only by the inability of governments to take a lead.  
 
In contrast, many other studies focus on technological drivers (Bockris 1999; Bossel 
et al. 2003; Kosugi et al. 2004; Owen & Gordon 2002). Some of these make the 
implicit assumption that ‘if it works’, the hydrogen economy will be realised, while 
others focus on costs, working on the principle that it has to ‘work’ at a price that is 
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competitive with conventional technologies (Mima & Criqui 2003; Thomas et al. 
1998).  
 
The literature also includes divergent views on the level at which driving factors 
should be considered. This means that the term ‘drivers’ has many interpretations, 
just as the terms ‘scenario’, ‘vision’ and ‘roadmap’ are used in a variety of different 
contexts. Exploratory scenarios consider drivers to be broader societal changes 
(social values, rate of technological change etc), while other studies defined 
government intervention and investment in R&D as a driver, or specific market 
demands, such as that for backup power.  
 
However, four overarching problems or policy objectives consistently stand out in 
the literature as providing the underlying drivers of a transition to a hydrogen future. 
These are: 
 
Climate change: Reducing carbon dioxide emissions is clearly considered to be the 
most important of these. Climate change is cited by all of the studies reviewed. 
Indeed, seven of the studies refer only to climate change as a reason for a transition 
to a hydrogen economy.  
 
Energy security This encompasses a range of concerns over the finite nature of oil 
and gas reserves, their geopolitical sensitivity and location, energy prices, and 
vulnerability of centralised energy systems to attack. No studies focused exclusively 
on this aspect, and eighteen made no mention of energy security at all. Of the studies 
that emphasise energy security (Arnasson & Sigfusson 2000; Australian 
Government 2003; DTI 2004; Dunn 2001; NHA 2004; Rifkin 2002; US Department 
of Energy 2002), most are roadmaps or visions. 
 
Local air quality: Many studies cited reductions in local air pollution as a 
significant benefit of a transition to a hydrogen economy, though only regionally 
focused studies, such as those from London and California (California Fuel Cell 
Partnership 2001;  London Hydrogen Action Plan 2002; Ogden 1999; Thomas 1998) 
gave this factor particular emphasis.  
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Competitiveness: Seven studies refer to international competitiveness as an 
important driver in the transition towards a hydrogen economy (Australian 
Government 2003; Fuel Cells Canada 2003; Fuel Cells UK 2003; Greater London 
Authority 2002; HyNet 2004; Owen & Gordon 2002; US Department of Energy 
2002). 
 
A final less frequently cited objective is the potential of FCVs to reduce noise 
pollution in urban areas. 
 
4.2 Barriers & Challenges 
 
The literature recognises a diverse range of barriers to the development a hydrogen 
economy. The three most prominent  are:  
 
 The absence of a hydrogen refuelling infrastructure - the difficulty of 
establishing a market for FCVs in the absence of a refuelling infrastructure - 
and vice versa.  
 
 High costs: particularly of fuel cells and of low-carbon hydrogen production.  
 
 Technological immaturity: hydrogen on-board storage and consequent 
limited current driving range of hydrogen vehicles; limited life-time of fuel 
cells. Several other technological challenges are specific to particular 
hydrogen futures, and will be discussed in the context of the differing 
technological architectures envisaged for hydrogen in section 4.4. 
 
Other frequently cited barriers include safety, public acceptability, and the absence 
of codes and standards.  
 
There are also many barriers that are picked up by only a few studies, including: the 
absence of surplus renewable electricity; social values that disregard the 
environment; a regulatory framework that currently supports fossil fuels; ability of 
incumbent technologies to adapt in the face of competition from hydrogen; limited 
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skills base; absence of global co-operation or plan of action; limited availability of 
fuel cell components, particularly platinum; difficulty of technological developers in 
accessing capital; lack of demand for hydrogen products; and, social opposition, 
uncertainty over viability and costs of carbon sequestration.  
 
4.3 In what kinds of future does hydrogen become important? 
 
The exploratory scenarios are rather consistent. Hydrogen emerges in future worlds 
where there is medium-strong economic growth, associated with rapid technological 
development; and when  
 
a) Concerns about the environment are strong, especially when climate change 
becomes obvious;  
or, 
 
b) When traditional energy supplies are expensive or vulnerable.  
 
Hydrogen does not emerge in worlds dominated by market rather than social values; 
where climate change impacts are small; where technological development is slow; 
and when economic growth stagnates. The development of hydrogen is patchy in 
worlds of strong regional autonomy, with strong uptake locally only in areas without 
significant oil or gas reserves. 
 
Does a hydrogen future rely on ‘step-changes’? 
It is noteworthy that  hydrogen generally emerges slowly or not at all in ‘Business as 
Usual’ type scenarios (Andersen et al. 2004; Australian Government 2003; Di Mario 
et al. 2003; Owen & Gordon 2002; Mima & Criqui 2003; Ohi 2001).  
 
In contrast, rapid penetration of hydrogen occurs only when there is strong 
government support (although typically even this is not seen as a sufficient 
condition: Andersen et al. 2004; Di Mario et al. 2003), or major ‘discontinuities’, 
such as shifts in social values (Di Mario et al. 2003; Ohi 2001), technological 
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breakthroughs that radically reduce costs  (Ohi 2001), shifts in the relative price of 

























4.4 What does the Hydrogen economy look like? 
 
The drivers, barriers and challenges outlined above shape a wide range of possible 
hydrogen economies, involving different technological trajectories and 
‘architectures’, demonstrating very different conceptions of what is meant by a 
‘hydrogen economy’. Only some (19) of the studies provide detail about the sources, 
uses and modes of distribution of energy in a hydrogen future. Of those that do, 
most fall into one of two broad technological architectures: decentralised or 
centralised, as illustrated below.  
 
1) Decentralised architectures 
 
 
These architectures are based on local production of hydrogen, from electrolysis, 
biomass processes, or steam reforming of natural gas. Some decentralised systems 
envisage hydrogen production from local energy sources (such as small-scale 
biomass conversion, or ‘micro’ renewables) while others see energy production as 
remaining centralised, with energy transferred to hydrogen production units (in 
homes or on forecourts) either as electricity or natural gas. Decentralised hydrogen 
production overcomes many of the infrastructural barriers facing a transition to 
hydrogen.  
 
Figure 1. Shows common building 
blocks of a decentralised hydrogen 
production systems. Text size of 
each building block indicates the 
number of studies that envisage a 
role for it. 
 
Key technologies: Small scale 
electrolysis and Steam Methane 
Reforming of natural gas (SMR), 
renewables, ‘energy station’ 





























Some studies (Foley 2001; NHA 2004), particularly those with a focus on road 
transport, see on-site hydrogen production as a transitional phase (for discussion of 
how these technological architectures change, see below). For others, 
decentralisation is a key feature of the hydrogen economy, allowing the benefits of 
distributed generation, home refuelling, and even the ‘democratisation of energy’ – 
empowering people by giving them control of energy (Rifkin 2002). Some of the 
decentralised systems involve synergy between the transport and heat & power 
sectors, with fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) both providing mobile power and selling 
power to the grid at times of peak demand (Australian Government 2003; Barreto et 
al. 2003; Dunn 2001; Lovins & Williams 1999). 
 
 
2) Centralised architectures 
 
 
A centralised system can draw on a wider variety of energy sources than 
decentralised systems (coal gasification and nuclear thermal hydrogen generation, 
for example, are largely incompatible with decentralised systems) but it depends on 
the development of a dedicated hydrogen distribution infrastructure. Many of the 
centralised systems focus on hydrogen use in road transport, and envisage local 
hydrogen pipeline grids linking early demonstration projects and fleet vehicle 
refuelling depots, creating ‘hydrogen corridors’ in areas of high demand. 
 
Figure 2. Shows common building 
blocks of a centralised hydrogen 
production systems. Text size of 
each building block indicates the 
number of studies that envisage a 
role for it. 
 
Key Technologies: Carbon 
sequestration, Pipelines, renewables, 
biomass, FCVs, Stationary fuel 
cells. 
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A third technological architecture, described by Bossel et al. (2003) and Arnasson & 
Sigfusson (2000), involves the use of hydrogen and captured carbon to synthesise 
liquid hydrocarbon fuels, such as methanol. These liquid hydrocarbon fuels can then 
be used in FCVs with on-board reforming. It is argued that this can be compatible 
with a low-carbon hydrogen economy, since the carbon for the fuel is captured from 
other sources (such as industrial emissions from metals processing (Arnasson & 
Sigfusson 2000), or biomass (Bossel et al. 2003). 
 
Other very different technological architectures are possible, e.g. the Shell scenarios, 
initially at least, envisage hydrogen sold ‘in a box’ as a fuel cartridge, which it is 
claimed breaks current distribution and infrastructure paradigms (Shell 2001). 
 
Many studies envisage a final mix of centralised and decentralised architectures, 
with pipelines in areas of strong demand, and with both centralised and 
decentralised production supplying the hydrogen market, or see one as a precursor to 
the other. 
 
Each architecture is dependent on key technological building blocks. 
If government or industry support a particular architecture, or simply expect a 
particular architecture to emerge, R&D will prioritise particular technological 
challenges, which may be irrelevant for other possible architectures. This highlights 
the role that expectations and visions of the future can play in directing 
technological change – a vision of a future architecture defines the technological 
challenges in the present. 
 
The corollary of this is that a technological ‘breakthrough’ may lead to a particular 
architecture becoming dominant. For example, the development of low-cost liquid 
hydrogen storage, or a (perceived) failure of solid storage and high-pressure tanks, 
could rule out decentralised systems, given the technological difficulties of small-
scale liquefaction. Similarly, a breakthrough in on-board reforming could make the 
synthetic liquid hydrocarbon route more attractive, obviating the need for on-board 
hydrogen storage. Breakthroughs in key technologies could thus produce ‘emerging 
irreversibilities’, leading to ‘lock-in’ or ‘path dependency’ (see Arthur 1989; David 
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1985;  Rip & Schot 2003), a phenomenon cited by some authors as a reason to avoid 
R&D in particular technologies, such as on-board methanol refuelling (Lovins & 
Williams 1999, NHA 2004). 
 
For decentralised systems, the major technological challenge is the expense of 
hydrogen from small-scale natural gas reformers and electrolysers, while centralised 
systems rely on the viability of a large-scale hydrogen distribution infrastructure, 
and prospects for centralised systems are greatly enhanced by cost effective coal 
gasification or nuclear-thermal water splitting.  
 
Additional technological developments are necessary for the envisaged hydrogen 
economies to be low-carbon: plentiful and competitive renewable electricity, carbon 
sequestration, or nuclear power. While fossil fuels are seen by most studies as 
transitional, some envisage a long term role for fossil fuels based on sequestration.  
 
Key technologies for all pathways include improved fuel cell power density and 
longevity, improved fuel cell economics, and fuel storage. Compressed hydrogen is 
seen as the most likely option by most studies, though solid state storage is thought 
to be a possible long term solution. Liquid hydrogen storage is considered to have a 
transitional role in some studies..  
 
The basis on which studies reject particular building blocks varies, from the ‘purely 
technological’ rejection of liquid storage as hopelessly energetically inefficient, to 
the rejection of components that fail to meet policy goals. For example, studies with 
an emphasis on climate change reject carbon-emitting hydrogen technologies, while 
studies concerned with energy security focus on nationally abundant resources, such 
as coal in the United States and Australia, wind in Denmark, and hydroelectricity in 
Iceland.  
 
In summary, the literature envisages a range of hydrogen economies, which are 
described in terms of alternative technological architectures. The future of hydrogen 
is thus contested. The roles of carbon sequestration, nuclear energy, renewable 
electricity, on-board reforming of hydrocarbons and the viability of pipelines and 
trucked hydrogen are all areas of particular debate and uncertainty. The basis on 
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which different elements, or ‘building blocks’, are included or rejected varies, but 
there are also shared elements. Almost all include fuel cell vehicles, and most 
include strong roles for renewables. Steam methane reforming is widely expected to 
be the principal method of producing hydrogen over the short-to-medium term. 
Finally it should be noted that crucial technological details are often omitted.  For 
example, many studies suggest a role for fuel cells in distributed electricity 
generation, but do not specify the type of fuel cell, or fuel used.  
 
4.5 Evolution of hydrogen economies  
 
As noted above much of the literature seeks to illuminate pathways to a hydrogen 
future. Whilst there is considerable variation in the transition paths described, a 
number of patterns are apparent, e.g. 
 
1) From decentralised to centralised: Most studies see the decentralised route as the 
key to by-passing the infrastructural problem, but some (e.g. US Department of 
Energy 2002) see centralised production as coming first, through the ‘link-up’ of 
demonstration projects and the creation of ‘hydrogen highways’ or ‘corridors’ 
fuelled with industrially produced hydrogen. 
 
2) From fossil fuels to renewables: Most studies see the ultimate hydrogen economy 
as fuelled entirely by renewables, with electricity and hydrogen as the dominant, and 
largely interchangeable energy carriers. Fossil fuels, and nuclear, are described, in 
some studies, as transitional technologies, or ‘bridges’. 
 
There are also disagreements about system evolution. There is broad agreement that 
fleet vehicles, refuelled at depots, will be the most likely entry point of hydrogen 
into road transport (despite evidence from other alternative fuels that fleets may be 
poor early markets; McNutt & Rodgers 2004). However, there is marked 
disagreement about the types of fuel cell vehicles that will be first to enter the 
market. One line of argument is that the technology exists for small passenger cars 
to decrease greatly in weight, thus to some extent reducing the power and storage 
requirements of fuel cell systems, and that such ‘hypercars’ are the ideal strategy for 
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a hydrogen transition (Lovins & Williams 1999). Others argue that large heavy 
goods vehicles are more appropriate early adopters, since the space and weight 
requirements are less stringent – especially true for shipping (Arnasson & Sigfusson 
2000; Farrell et al. 2001). The ability of fuel cells to provide auxiliary power for 
services (especially IT) inside luxury and large vehicles (such as SUVs), could 
provide convenience that will offset minor losses in driving range and performance 
(Kurani et al. 2003). 
 
Another area of disagreement concerns the sequence of introduction of FCVs and 
stationary fuel cells, with views differing about which are likely to enter and 
dominate markets first. 
 
4.6 Early learning: the importance of niche markets in technology 
development 
 
A variety of early niche markets are either recognised or advocated as providing an 
important stage for the development of a hydrogen economy. Most of these early 
markets or technologies are described as overcoming cost barriers, by providing 
niche applications that allow learning and scale economies, as well as increasing 
public familiarity. The role of learning in niche applications is stressed in many 
approaches to technological change (e.g. Kemp, Schot & Hoogma 1998). 
 
1) H2 Internal Combustion Engine vehicles – Hydrogen ICEs are far cheaper than 
FCVs, and are likely to remain so for some years. Their adoption could provide low 
pollution vehicles that help stimulate a market for hydrogen, and provide a means 
for public familiarity with hydrogen as a fuel.  
 
2) Portable electronics and consumer goods – Widely seen as the most likely early 
fuel cell market, growth in micro and small fuel cell sales is thought likely to help 
drive down fuel cell prices, and push fuel cell acceptability and familiarity. 
 
3) Remote and off-grid power – Would bring down FC system costs, allowing 
cheaper small scale electrolysis or steam methane reforming.  
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4) Premium/backup power – as above. It is argued that stationary fuel cells for 
backup or premium power, using the ‘energy station’ concept described above, 
could potentially become nodes for hydrogen refuelling. 
 
6) Injection of hydrogen into natural gas mix (up to 20%), and either using the 
mixture directly to lower emissions, or separate the gas and hydrogen, and using the 
natural gas network as a nascent hydrogen pipeline network (Andersen et al. 2004) 
 
7) Auxiliary power units (APUs) for vehicles – APUs would provide electricity in 
vehicles much more efficiently than current systems, and remain available when the 
engine is off, making them attractive to the military and long-haul trucks in 
particular (Lutsey et al. 2003). The cost challenges for APUs are much less daunting 
than for automotive cells.  
 
8) Ships – not constrained by size and weight as much as passenger cars, so storage 
is less of an issue. Can provide both reductions in fuel cell costs, and learning 
processes that will stimulate progress (Farrell et al. 2001). 
 
8) Demonstration projects – Currently the largest market for fuel cells. Public 
authorities and companies eager to demonstrate commitment to high technology and 
green values are providing a niche demand for fuel cells, allowing cost 
improvements through scale economies and learning. 
 






































































Figure 3. Shows estimated dates for a transition to a fuel cell based transport system. 
 
Figure 3 above sketches the estimates made for the transition to fuel cell vehicles, a 
‘building block’ common to all but a few of the hydrogen futures studies. We have 
included estimates from two studies that were not included in the review, as their 
major focus is other than hydrogen (IEA 2003; RAC 2002). The chart is a graphical 
aid, rather than formal plotting of estimates (the Y axis is not standardised and is 
inevitably somewhat subjective), but serves to illustrate both the diversity of views 
on a likely timetable for transition, and some common threads. The chart shows 
predictions of what is likely or possible, rather than proposed targets, which have 
not been plotted. Where studies straddle categories along the Y axis, different 
possible futures were considered in the study with differing levels of FCV 




Many studies recommend particular policy paths, and a number of approaches are 
evident. At one extreme, one study advocates “the formation of a new environmental 
consciousness of the general public of all countries…based on scientific, highly 
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reliable predictions” (Goltsov & Veziroglu 2001). Other studies, rather more 
prosaically, propose the variety of specific measures outlined below. 
 
The four most commonly advocated policy measures are: 
 Increased R&D funding (often targeted at specific problems, particularly 
storage);  
 Public education programmes;  
 Infrastructure development (sometimes through establishment and ‘link up’ 
of demonstration projects);  
 Tax incentives for hydrogen fuel and vehicles.  
 
Other commonly recommended policies include: the development of codes & 
standards; mandates for zero emission vehicles; promotion of hydrogen through 
government and industry champions; clear government support to stimulate 
confidence and attract investment. Other recommendations include support for 
renewables; development and dissemination of a clear ‘transition strategy’ to 
provide confidence and reduce uncertainty; targets for low carbon vehicles; and 
improving the fuel cells skills base. 
 
In the policy recommendations proposed, there is a tension between the risks of 
‘winner-picking’, and of ‘lock-in’. A winner picking strategy, involving definition 
of the technologies of the future, is high risk and arguably unrealistic – we can never 
know the best technology in advance. Conversely, an incremental approach, 
avoiding picking winners by providing a goal-oriented policy framework (e.g. 
incentives for low carbon vehicles), may be subject to ‘lock-in’ to current 
technological trajectories, which only winner-picking policies can break. 
 
4.9 What does a hydrogen economy achieve? 
 
Six studies address the extent to which a transition to a hydrogen future will 
ameliorate CO2 emissions (Barreto et al. 2003; Di Mario et al. 2003; Eyre et al. 
2002; Hart et al. 2003; Owen & Gordon 2002; Watson et al. 2004). All conclude that 
hydrogen, and in particular fuel cell vehicles, can make a significant impact on 
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reducing carbon emissions in the long term. However, three of these (Eyre et al. 
2002; and Hart et al. 2003; Owen & Gordon 2002) suggested that the benefits from a 
transfer to hydrogen will only occur after 2030-2050, and that moving to a 
hydrogen-based road transport system before this is likely to increase total carbon 
emissions (either on a wells-to-wheels basis, or through the displacement of carbon 
gains from renewable electricity). 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Futures in Hydrogen: The state of the art 
The literature reveals a range of sophisticated models, exploratory narrative 
techniques, simplistic trend extrapolations, rhetorical arguments, and strategic plans. 
Very few used participatory techniques, with the notable exception of many 
roadmaps, and two of the exploratory studies. None of the backcast studies 
represented a major and theoretically grounded backcasting exercise. Of all the 
studies describing hydrogen futures, only four made any reference to theoretical 
literatures of technological change. 
 
The six types of study reveal five ways of considering and understanding the future 
of hydrogen energy and hydrogen technologies: 
i) As a product competing in a largely context-free market place (forecasts) 
ii) As a possibility among many as broader changes in society unfold (exploratory 
scenarios) 
iii) As a sequence of possible technological systems or architectures. (technical 
scenarios) 
iv) As a normative vision of a future world, in which hydrogen saves society 
(visions) 




What is wrong with the hydrogen futurist’s toolbox? 
 The general lack of theory leads to several of the common futures ‘pitfalls’ 
identified by Geels & Smit (2000): for example, determinism and a pre-
occupation with new, ‘exotic’ technologies. Furthermore, many of the 
studies that lack a theoretical background ‘model’ the effects of technology 
policies in their depiction of a hydrogen transition, making assumptions 
about the effects of policies on innovation and diffusion of new 
technologies, but without making the basis for these assumptions explicit. 
 
 Lack of transparency and participation. 
 
 Lack of distinctness or clarity in the roadmaps 
 
 Predictions, forecasts and targets are recycled in the literature, deployed as 
arguments to confirm particular views of the future, rather than treated as 
best guesses under uncertainty, and targets tend to be recycled as predictions 
(e.g. the London Hydrogen Action Plan picks up targets from the Japanese 
Vision). 
 
 The literature tends to provide a rather top down view, emphasising global 
and national drivers whilst paying little attention to the local challenges and 
opportunities associated with particular geographical areas 
 
 Few studies seek to systematically assess the broader sustainability impacts 
of a large-scale transition to a hydrogen economy. So for example there is 
little attempt to deal with product lifecycle and waste/de-commissioning 
issues – such as the possible toxicity of fuel cell components or hydrogen 
storage materials.  
 
 Many of the studies reviewed tend to treat prospective developments in 
hydrogen in relative isolation, rather than as embedded features of 
overarching energy and transport  systems. As a result they tend to give 
insufficient attention to the broader systems changes required for the 
envisaged hydrogen futures to be achieved, for example with respect to the 
primary energy basis of particular Hydrogen routes. 
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Moreover, many of the descriptive futures appear to display a pro-hydrogen bias, as 
is clear from the way that barriers to a hydrogen transition are considered. For 
example, the difficulty of storing hydrogen, a function of its low mass, is framed not 
as a disadvantage, but as a technological ‘challenge’. 
 
On the basis of the above one could argue that there is a need for more critical 
theoretically informed studies, explicitly addressing the sustainability, energy and 
transport policy implications, and socio-technological dynamics of the transition 
hydrogen. However, this criticism needs to be set against the broader function of 
much of this literature in stimulating imaginative thinking and so ‘opening up’ 
different possible socio-economic and technological futures, rather of ‘closing 
down’ possible options on the basis of inevitably incomplete knowledge. 
Furthermore, whilst this review has drawn attention to the lack of rigour in the 
treatment of technological change and socio-technical transitions found in much of 
the hydrogen futures literature, one needs balance this against the limited predictive 
utility of current theoretical approaches to these issues.       
 
What can we learn from the hydrogen futures literature?  
 
The literature represents a rich resource describing the diversity of opinions about 
possible and desirable hydrogen futures, demonstrating that the hydrogen economy 
is not a simple, single idea. Moreover, this diversity of opinions extends beyond 
possible hydrogen systems, and includes the criteria on which those systems are 
understood and evaluated, implying that purely technological understandings alone 
will be unable to define a single ‘sustainable hydrogen economy’. 
 
More specifically, the questions explored in section 4 provide insights into specific 
areas: 
 
 Amidst a range of opinions about the types of factor that will shape the 
future of hydrogen, four major policy drivers are evident in the literature: 
climate change, energy security, air pollution, and perceived competitive 
advantage in developing hydrogen technologies.  
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 Three major barriers are also clear: infrastructure, technological immaturity, 
and cost. 
 
 In ‘business as usual’ scenarios, hydrogen emerges slowly or not at all. In 
this literature, hydrogen only emerges quickly where governments take 
strong action in the face of climate change or security fears, or radical 
technological or social change occur. 
 
 There is no agreement on what a ‘hydrogen economy’ might look like.  
 
 Despite uncertainty about how a hydrogen economy will emerge and evolve, 
a series of ‘promising niches’ were identified as playing important roles in a 
transition. Widely divergent views exist on the likely dates of ‘market entry’ 
for fuel cell vehicles.  
 
 There is considerable uncertainty over what, in terms of greenhouse gas 
emissions, a transition to hydrogen energy would achieve in the short to 
medium term. 
 
Conclusion: No Hydrogen Economy, but many hydrogen 
economies. 
 
Shared visions and expectations of the future can be powerful forces in the shaping 
of technology, directing and constraining research efforts by providing a mental map 
of future ‘possibility space’; recruiting support; mobilising resources; and providing 
a ‘protected space’ for new and emergent technologies, whose future promise can do 
much to offset their present poor performance (Geels & Smit 2000; van Lente, 
1993). The Hydrogen Economy is one such vision, yet the range of possible 
hydrogen economies depicted in this review demonstrate that the shape of a future 
hydrogen economy is contested rather than shared. Key disagreements focus on the 
sources of hydrogen, with disputes over the roles of nuclear power and carbon 




It may be that the indistinctness of the ‘hydrogen economy’ is part of the key to its 
rhetorical power. Berkhout (2004), borrowing a phrase from Bijker’s work on the 
Social Construction of Technology (Bijker 1995), claims that visions with greater 
‘interpretive flexibility’ have a greater ability to compete among multiple possible 
images of the future. This could help explain why many of the roadmaps fail to 
specify what is meant by a hydrogen economy – their very vagueness allows 
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Table 1: A typology of hydrogen futures 
 
Forecasts use formal quantitative extrapolation and modelling to predict 
likely futures from current trends. 
 
Exploratory scenarios explore possible futures. They emphasise drivers, 
and do not specify a predetermined desirable end state towards which 








Technical scenarios explore possible future technological systems based 
on hydrogen. They emphasise the technical feasibility and implications of 
different options, rather than explore how different futures might unfold. 
 
Visions are elaborations of a desirable and (more or less) plausible future. 
They emphasise the benefits of hydrogen rather than the pathways through 
which a hydrogen future might be achieved. 
 
Backcasts and pathways start with a predetermined ‘end’ point – a 








Roadmaps describe a sequence of measures designed to bring about a 
desirable future. Studies from the previous four groups, or elements of 
these groups, frequently form the basis for the identification of specific 












 Study Brief description 
Christidis et al. 
2003 
Study using the IPTS Transport Technologies model to explore fuel cell vehicle 
market penetration with business as usual projections, plus sensitivity to oil price, 
industry decisions, and carbon policies.  
Fukushima et al. 
2004 
Uses quantitative model to project diffusion of solid oxide fuel cells for power 
generation in Japan, exploring sensitivity to technological change, component 
availability and recycling, and fuel price.  
Kosugi et al. 2004 A survey of expert opinion used to provide predictions of fuel cell technological development. 
Mima & Criqui 
2003 
Uses New & Renewable Technologies module of the POLES world energy model 
to forecast penetration of fuel cells into both stationary and mobile applications, and 







Thomas et al. 1998 
Uses a market penetration model to predict fuel cell vehicle uptake under the 
California Zero Emission Vehicle mandate, and calculates returns on investment, 
and social cost/benefit ratios. 
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Table 3.  
 
 Study Brief description 
Andersen et al. 
2004 
Participatory exercise based on the development of qualitative scenarios to describe 
possible contexts for hydrogen development, followed by workshops to generate 




Develops qualitative scenarios for high, medium and low hydrogen uptake. 
Explores the combinations of drivers that might push a hydrogen economy. 
Barreto et al. 
2003 
Elaborates on the SRES-B1 scenario developed by the IPCC. Hydrogen is 
introduced in a qualitative scenario, and this is then quantified using MESSAGE-
MACRO 
Di Mario et al. 
2003 
Uses the SRES B1 scenario as a baseline around which two alternative hydrogen 
scenarios are explored, with low and high hydrogen uptake. Each of the scenarios 
are then quantified. 
Kurani et al. 
2003 
Explores the growth in three sets of infrastructure: transport, communications, and 
power grids, and uses these socio-technical trends to explore the future for FCVs as 
mobile communications and power platforms. 
Ohi 2002 
Three qualitative scenarios, structured around rate of technological change and 
dominant social values, are used to explore possible futures for hydrogen and R&D 
strategies that are robust across scenarios. 













Watson et al. 
2004 
Uses the UK DTI Foresight Futures framework to structure four qualitative 










Table 4: Major drivers in exploratory scenarios 
 





Rate of economic growth 
Strength of social & environmental values 
Rate of technological change 
Conventional energy price 
Economic growth defines 
energy price, and to a 
large extent technological 
change. Environmental 
values strongest in 
highest growth world, 
lowest in low growth 
world.  
Ohi 2002 Environmental & Social activism 
Rate of technological change 
Strong social values can 
make increased R&D 
funding politically 




Not expressed as ‘dimensions for change’ in the 
study itself – these are inferred. 
Balance of power: market vs. state 
Severity of climate change impacts 
Security of oil supplies 
Environmental concerns 
vary according to the 
market vs state 
relationship, with the 
most market-oriented 
scenario having least 
concern. 
Watson et al. 
2004 
Used the dimensions of the UK Foresight: 
Strength of social & environmental values 
Governance system: autonomy-globalisation 
Assumes that 
technological change, 
rates of economic growth, 
etc are ultimately derived 
from these fundamental 
dimensions of change. 
Shell 2001 Resource scarcity 
Technological advance 
Social and personal priorities 
Assumed correlations not 
clear  
Di Mario et 
al. 2003 
Used the dimensions of the IPCC Special 
Report on Emissions Scenarios 
B1 world only (see above), rates of hydrogen 
penetration within this determined by 
government support. 
Strong environmental 
values and globally co-
ordinated decision-
making allow steady and 
sustained economic 
growth. 
Kurani et al. 
2003 
Explored only one future – characterised by 
three driving dimensions 
Growth in mobility 
Growth in mobile energy demand 
Growth in mobile communications  
Assumed correlation 
between the three 
dimensions. 
Barreto et al. 
2003 
Used the dimensions of the IPCC Special 
Report on Emissions Scenarios  
B1 world – high environmental values, strong 
globally co-ordinated decision-making. 
Strong environmental 
values and globally co-
ordinated decision-











Table 5. Studies classified as ‘Technical Scenarios’ 
 Study Brief description 
Eyre et al. 2002 
Uses qualitative scenarios to define energy demand conditions in 2050, and then 
examined the carbon emissions of alternative possible technological systems that 
would meet that demand. 
Hart et al. 2003 
Examines implications of supplying transport energy demand with renewably 
produced hydrogen or biofuels, given estimates of 2050 transport demand. Models 
penetration of different combinations of vehicle and fuel technology, and examines 
the carbon impacts. 
Ogden 1999 
Outlines five alternative possible systems that would meet projected transport 
demand for southern California in 2020, and calculates the investment costs 
associated with each. 
Sørensen et al. 
2004 
Describes two possible technological systems based on hydrogen and wind 
electricity, matching hour by hour electricity demand, and for each system 














Uses the Analytic Hierarchy Process to explore the benefits and disadvantages of 
alternative fuel cell vehicle fuel configurations, and conducts a sensitivity analysis 









Table 6. Studies classified as ‘Visions’ 
 
 Study Brief description 
Arnason & 
Sigfusson 2000 
Describes a possible future for Iceland, based on hydrogen and renewably 
produced methanol. 
Bockris 1999 Describes a solar-hydrogen future for the US 
Bossel et al. 
2003 
Presents an argument against the use of hydrogen as a fuel, and provides a 
possible alternative – a synthetic liquid hydrocarbon economy. 
Dunn 2001 Presents hydrogen as the fuel of the future, and describes a vision of what a hydrogen economy will involve. 
Goltsov & 
Veziroglu 2001 
Presents a vision of the ‘hydrogen civilisation’, a future world posed as the only 
alternative to continued dependence on fossil fuels. 
Lovins & 
Williams 1999 
Describes a future hydrogen economy, and outlines some of the components of 
the transition, in the form of super-efficient vehicles and synergy between mobile 
and stationary power. 
Rifkin 2002 
Outlines a decentralised and democratic vision of the future for hydrogen and 
energy, drawing parallels with the internet, and introducing the concept of the 








Draws a parallel between the Apollo programme to put a man on the moon, and 
the challenge of energy independence and hydrogen; describes how hydrogen 








Table 7. Studies classified as ‘Backcasts & Pathways’ 





Outlines criteria for defining successful commercialisation, and then explores 
specific barriers and threats to achieving that success, and four possible transition 
pathways based on four different fuels: hydrogen, methanol, gasoline, and ethanol. 
Foley 2001 Explores policies and pathways by which hydrogen might be introduced into transport. 
Fuel Cells UK 
2003 
Presents a vision of the future for fuel cells in the UK, and explores the important 
trends that will set the context for the transition towards that vision.  
Mauro et al. 
1996 
Presents two alternative transition routes to a hydrogen economy, a centralised 
route, and a decentralised ‘village path’, exploring the potential for off-grid and 
remote community applications. 
Owen & 
Gordon 2002 
Technical analysis of two routes towards commercially viable fuel cell vehicles, and 












Wurster 2002 Explores how a hydrogen refuelling infrastructure might develop. 
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Table 8.  
Caption:  
Table 8. Studies classified as ‘Roadmaps’ 
 Study Brief description 
DTI 2004 Outlines the actions and decision points for the development of hydrogen technologies 
EST 2002 Outlines steps that need to be taken in 2005, 2010, and 2020 in order to achieve low 
carbon transport in the UK. 
Fuel Cells 
Canada 2003 
Stakeholder workshop process used to generate targets and milestones in key areas 




Describes a series of actions for the Greater London Authority to promote the 
development of hydrogen in London. 
Hynet 2004 Builds on a hydrogen vision for Europe, and outlines timelines and necessary action for the visions to be realised. 
NHA 2004 
A study based on workshops to identify key goals for hydrogen commercialisation, 
and barriers and solutions to those goals, in order to produce a realistic and 
plausible roadmap for hydrogen development.   








of Energy 2002 
Roadmap developed through stakeholder workshop process, outlining key targets 
and milestones in the development of a US hydrogen economy. 
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Captions to Illustrations 
 
 
Figure 1.  Shows common building blocks of a decentralised hydrogen production systems. 
Text size of each building block indicates the number of studies that envisage a role 
for it. Key technologies: Small scale electrolysis and Steam Methane Reforming of 






Figure 2.  Shows common building blocks of a centralised hydrogen production systems. Text 
size of each building block indicates the number of studies that envisage a role for 
it. Key Technologies: Carbon sequestration, Pipelines, renewables, biomass, FCVs, 
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